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Laboratory experiments have been used extensively in economics in the past several decades to lend
both positive and normative insights into a myriad of important economic issues.  This study discusses
a related approach that has increasingly grown in prominence of late--field experiments.  I argue that
field experiments serve as a useful bridge between data generated in the lab and empirical studies using
naturally-occurring data.  In discussing this relationship, I highlight that field experiments can yield
important insights into economic theory and provide useful guidance to policymakers.  I also draw
attention to an important methodological contribution of field experiments:  they provide an empirical
account of behavioral principles that are shared across different domains.  In this regard, at odds with
conventional wisdom, I argue that representativeness of the environment, rather than representative
of the sampled population, is the most crucial variable in determining generalizability of results for








Experimentation is ubiquitous.  As active adults, we have learned how to 
communicate effectively and how to use markets to meet our everyday wants and 
needs through experimentation.  As undergraduate and graduate students, we have 
discovered how much study time is necessary to reach our intrinsic and extrinsic 
goals.  As teachers, we have learned through experimentation about preparation 
time and striking the appropriate balance between conceptual and applied lectures 
to produce stimulating intellectual environments.  As researchers, we have learned 
through trial and error what makes a good academic paper.  Combining this 
natural tendency with the fact that complexities of markets severely constrain the 
ability of traditional economic tools to examine behavioral relationships, it is not 
surprising that economists have increasingly turned to controlled laboratory 
experimentation.  Indeed, laboratory experiments can provide important insights 
into certain behavioral phenomena that otherwise are impenetrable.   
  A central goal of this study is to provide an introduction to a related 
empirical methodology—field experiments—that have dramatically risen in 
popularity over the past several years.  My approach in this introduction will be as 
one viewed through the lens of the BE-JEAP special issue on field experiments, 
which I served as the Guest Editor.  Given that field experiments will likely 
continue to grow in popularity as scholars continue to take advantage of the 
settings where economic phenomena present themselves, it seems to be the 
perfect moment to step back and discuss a few of the areas wherein field 
experiments have contributed.  The set of studies published in the special issue 
highlight both extensions of some of the various areas within select 
microeconomic subfields as well as provide a useful illustration of the types of 
field experiments currently employed in social science.  I attempt to weave these 
various studies into a cohesive fabric that highlights the value of field 
experimentation in economics—both to theorists and policymakers.  In this sense, 
this study is by no means comprehensive in its summary of what, and how, field 
experiments have contributed to the economics literature to date; rather it should 
be viewed as a summary of a portion of the literature. 
A second goal of this study is to draw attention to a methodological 
contribution of field experiments:  exploring the relationship between lab and 
field behavior.  I argue that such an examination requires a theoretical framework 
accompanied by empirical evidence.  Just as we would want a theoretical model 
of firm and consumer behavior to tell us what parameter we are estimating when 
we regress quantities on prices, we need a model of laboratory behavior to tell us 
what is the data-generating process, and how it is related to other contexts.   
Indeed, theory is the tool that permits us to take results from one environment to 
predict in another, and laboratory generalizability should be no exception.  Under 
this view, field experiments represent an empirical approach that bridges 
laboratory data and naturally-occurring data.  This is convenient since on the one  
hand, economic theory is inspired by behavior in the field, so we would like to 
know if results from the laboratory domain are transferable to field environments.  
Alternatively, since it is often necessary to make strict assumptions to achieve 
identification using naturally-occurring data, we wonder whether such causal 
effects can be found with less restrictive assumptions.   
Beyond these contributions, in complementary cases, field experiments 
can play an important role in the discovery process by allowing us to make 
stronger inference than can be achieved from lab or uncontrolled data alone.
1  
Similar to the spirit in which astronomy draws on the insights from particle 
physics and classical mechanics to make sharper insights, field experiments can 
help to provide the necessary behavioral principles to permit sharper inference 
from laboratory or naturally-occurring data.  Alternatively, field experiments can 
help to determine whether lab or field results should be reinterpreted or defined 
more narrowly than first believed.  In other cases, field experiments might help to 
uncover the causes and underlying conditions necessary to produce data patterns 
observed in the lab or the field.   
I conclude with the thought that proper utilization of field experiments can 
in some small way contribute to the beginning of the end of “schools of thought” 
in empirical economics.  Each of the viable empirical methods—experimental and 
non-experimental—has important strengths and limitations and by carefully 
exploring theoretically and empirically the nature and extent of the various factors 
that potentially influence insights gained from each, experimentalists and non-
experimentalists alike can begin to discuss the issues of the day using empirical 
and theoretical evidence rather than rhetoric designed to advance a particular 
position.  In the end, the various empirical approaches should be thought of as 
strong complements—much like theory and empirical modeling—and combining 
insights from each of the methodologies will permit economists to develop a 
deeper understanding of our science.   
  The remainder of this study proceeds as follows.  The next section 
provides a discussion and brief overview of measurement models, concluding 
with a classification of the different types of field experiments.  Section 2 
summarizes some of the uses of the various types of field experiments, and briefly 
describes results from some recent field experiments, including the contributions 
in this current volume.  This section is meant to be illustrative, rather than 





                                                 
1 Field experiments can also provide insights similar to lessons learned from laboratory 
experiments that Roth (1995) discusses (speaking to theorists and policymakers; fact finding, etc.).    
1.  Brief Background 
 
A useful first step in describing field experiments is to consider how the 
identification strategy relates to other measurement approaches.  To complete this 
task, I closely follow the discussion in Harrison and List (2004), which contains 
very similar introductory empirical arguments.  The goal of any evaluation 
method is to construct the proper counterfactual.  Without loss of generality, 
define y1 as the outcome with treatment, y0 as the outcome without treatment, and 
let T = 1 when treated and T = 0 when not treated.  The treatment effect for person 
i can then be measured as τi = yi1 - yi0.  The major problem, however, is one of a 
missing counterfactual—person i is not observed in both states.  Economists for 
years have developed methods to create the missing counterfactual.  Figure 1 
highlights a handful of related empirical approaches that are commonly 
employed—ranging from methods that generate data to techniques used to model 
data.   
 
Figure 1:  A Spectrum of Measurement Models 
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Where: 
  LAB:    Lab experiment 
  NE:    Natural experiment 
  PSM:    Propensity score matching 
  IV:   Instrumental variables estimation 
  STR:    Structural modeling 
 
In the Westernmost portion of Figure 1 is the class of studies that generate 
data via laboratory experiments.  By construction, the ideal laboratory 
experimental environment represents the “cleanest test tube” case.  Some might 
view sterility as a detraction, but it can serve an important purpose:  in an ideal 
laboratory experiment, this very sterility allows an uncompromising glimpse at 
the effects of exogenous treatments on behavior in the lab.  Of course, making 
generalizations outside of the lab domain might prove difficult in some cases, but 
to obtain the effect of treatment in this particular domain the only assumption 
necessary is appropriate randomization (with meaningful sample sizes).   
The Easternmost part of the empirical spectrum in Figure 1 includes 
examples of econometric models that make necessary assumptions to identify 
treatment effects from naturally-occurring data.  For example, identification in 
natural experiments results from a difference-in-difference  regression  model:      
Yit = Xit β + τTit + ηit, where i indexes the unit of observation, t indexes the year, 
Yit is the outcome, Xit is a vector of controls, Tit is a binary treatment variable,     
ηit = αi + λt + εit, and τ is measured by comparing the difference in before and after 
outcomes for the treated group with the before and after outcomes for the 
non-treated group.
2  A major identifying assumption in this case is that there are 
no time-varying, unit-specific shocks to the outcome variable that are correlated 
with  Tit, and that selection into treatment is independent of the temporary 
individual-specific effect.   
Useful alternatives include the method of propensity score matching 
(PSM) developed in Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983).  Again, if both states of the 
world were observable, the average treatment effect, τ , would equal  0 1 y y −  
(where “−” represents the mean).  Given that only  1 y  or  0 y  is observed for each 
unit, however, unless assignment into the treatment group is random, generally 
0 1 y y − ≠ τ .  The solution advocated by Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) is to find a 
vector of covariates, Z, such that    , | , 0 1 Z T y y ⊥   ) 1 , 0 ( ) | 1 ( ∈ = Z T pr , where ⊥  
denotes independence.  This assumption is called the “conditional independence 
assumption” and intuitively means that given Z, the non-treated outcomes are 
what the treated outcomes would have been had they not been treated.  Or, 
likewise, that selection occurs only on observables.  If this condition holds, then 
treatment assignment is said to be ‘strongly ignorable’ (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 
1983, p. 43).  To estimate the average treatment effect (on the treated), only the 
weaker condition E[y0 | T=1,Z] = E[y0 | T=0,Z] = E[y0 | Z]   ) 1 , 0 ( ) | 1 ( ∈ = Z T pr is 
required.  Thus, the treatment effect is given by  ] | [ 0 1 Z y y E − = τ , implying that 
conditional on Z, assignment to the treatment group mimics a randomized 
experiment.
3   
Other popular methods of measurement include the use of instrumental 
variables (see Rosenzweig and Wolpin, 2000) and structural modeling.   
Assumptions of these approaches are well documented and are not discussed 
further (see Blundell and Costas Dias, 2002, for a useful review).  Between 
                                                 
2 Note that in this formulation the analyst is assuming a common treatment effect, τ, rather than a 
heterogeneous treatment effect, τi.  Use of a random coefficients econometric model in this 
framework permits estimation of heterogeneous treatment effects. 
3 Several aspects of the approach are “left on the sidelines” in this necessarily brief discussion.  
For example, for these conditions to hold the appropriate conditioning set, Z, should be multi-
dimensional.  Second, upon estimation of the propensity score, a matching algorithm must be 
defined in order to estimate the missing counterfactual, y0, for each treated observation.  The 
average treatment effect on the treated (TT) is given by τTT = E[E[y1  | T=1, p(Z)] - E[y0  | T=0, 
p(Z)]] = E[E[y1  - y0  | p(Z)]], where the outer expectation is over the distribution of Z | T = 1.  
These and other issues are discussed in List et al (2004).  I return to some of these issues below 
when discussing generalizability.  
laboratory experiments and natural experiments in Figure 1 are the various types 
of field experiments.  I now turn to a more detailed discussion of controlled 
experimentation, the focus of the remainder of this study. 
   
1.1  Laboratory Experiments 
 
Current practice concerning the design of a controlled laboratory experiment in 
economics largely relies on Plott (1979), Wilde (1980), and Smith (1982), as does 
the following brief summary discussion.  The experimenter’s goal is to create a 
small-scale environment in the laboratory where adequate control is maintained.  
Such control is necessary to ensure appropriate measurement of treatment effects.  
An economic environment consists of a set of agents (1,….n) and commodities 
(1,…k).  Each agent is described by a utility function, ui, a technology or 
knowledge endowment, Ki, and a commodity endowment, wi.  Each agent is 
therefore described by εi(ui,Ki,wi), and the microeconomic environment is defined 
by the collection of agents, ε = (εi……εn).   
To complete the microeconomic environment, the experimenter specifies 
the institutional setting, I, which includes the appropriate message space, M, the 
allocation rules, H, and other relevant characteristics of the specific institution of 
interest. The experimental system, S = (ε,  I), thus is composed of the 
microeconomic environment and the institution.  Agents, who are assumed to 
possess consistent preferences and to make decisions so as to maximize their own 
well-being, choose messages, and the institution determines allocations via the 
governing rules.  
In order to measure reliably the behavioral principles between preferences, 
institutions, and outcomes, experimenters have proposed a set of sufficient 
conditions for a valid controlled microeconomic experiment (Wilde, 1980; Smith, 
1982).  These five “precepts” are now commonly used to motivate good 
experimental practice.  They are: nonsatiation (more money is preferred to less), 
salience (actions are linked to rewards), dominance (the reward structure 
dominates subjective costs), privacy (each subject is given his/her own payoff 
structure), and parallelism, the subject of discussion later in this article.
4   
                                                 
4 Of some importance for later purposes is the role of privacy as a precept; or what Siegel and 
Fouraker (1960) term “incomplete information.”  The idea is that if an individual has preferences 
not only over own-rewards, but also over others’ rewards, a loss of control might result unless the 
experimenter maintains privacy of the reward structure because such “other-regarding” 
preferences are not observed.  This is not to suggest that laboratory experiments cannot explore the 
effect of person A obtaining positive satisfaction from person B's consumption on market 
outcomes.  Indeed, some would argue that simply inducing such preferences can achieve this task.  
Yet a strong word of caution is necessary at this point.  Implicit in economic theory and in 
laboratory induced value experiments is that the behavioral relationship between preferences, 
institutions, and outcomes is independent of the sources of those preferences.  For example, the  
From this description, the power of an ideal laboratory experiment readily 
becomes apparent.  In some sense, lab experimentation is the most convincing 
method of creating the counterfactual, since it directly constructs a control group 
via randomization.  Such randomization acts as an instrumental variable and 
therefore allows the analyst to make strong causal statements within the domain 
of study.   
  This particular attractiveness, which is in the spirit of the experimental 
model of the physical and biological sciences, has helped to make experimental 
economics a “boom industry”.  Holt (2005) documents that publications using the 
methodology were almost non-existent until the mid-1960s, surpassed 50 annually 
for the first time in 1982, and by 1998 exceeded 200 per year.   
 
1.2  Field Experiments 
 
In my own work, I have defined field experiments in much the same manner as 
The Oxford English Dictionary (Second Edition) defines the word “field”:  “Used 
attributively to denote an investigation, study, etc., carried out in the natural 
environment of a given material, language, animal, etc., and not in the laboratory, 
study, or office.” Similar to laboratory experiments, field experiments use 
randomization to achieve identification.  Different from laboratory experiments, 
however, field experiments occur in the natural environment of the agent being 
observed and cannot be reasonably distinguished from the tasks the agent has 
entered the marketplace to complete.   
Harrison and List (2004) propose six factors that can be used to determine 
the field context of an experiment:  the nature of the subject pool, the nature of the 
information that the subjects bring to the task, the nature of the commodity, the 
nature of the task or trading rules applied, the nature of the stakes, and the 
environment in which the subjects operate (see also Carpenter et al, 2005).  Using 
these factors, they discuss a broad classification scheme that helps to organize 
one’s thoughts about the factors that might be important when moving from the 
lab to the field.   
                                                                                                                                     
treatment effect of measuring how individual bids change in response to an institutional change 
from a first price sealed bid auction to a second price sealed bid auction is independent of the 
underlying motivation for why the agent values the good in the first place (i.e., if I value a 
sportscard at $10, it is irrelevant that the reason is because I want to put it in my bicycle spokes or 
because my daughter likes the card; the market receives the same contribution to market demand 
in each case).  This assumption might be tenuous in some instances of inducing social preferences 
(i.e., motivations for social preferences might include altruism, envy, and reciprocity, which in 
certain games will induce different types of behavior and equilibria).  In other words, when 
inducing social preferences, one is not sure that utility is truly increasing in the reward medium. 
(i.e., more money for others is not known with certainty to be utility increasing, regardless of the 
stakes or preferences induced).  
Figure 2:  A Field Experiment Bridge 
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Where: 
  LAB:    Lab experiment 
  AFE:   Artefactual field experiment 
  FFE:   Framed field experiment 
  NFE:   Natural field experiment 
  NE:    Natural experiment 
  PSM:    Propensity score matching 
  IV:   Instrumental variables estimation 
  STR:    Structural modeling 
 
As Figure 2 illustrates, a first departure from laboratory experiments using 
student subjects is to execute an “artefactual” field experiment (AFE; see 
Harrison and List, 2004).  This type of controlled experiment represents a useful 
type of exploration beyond traditional laboratory studies.  I am reminded of this 
fact by my days at the Council of Economic Advisers, where in a debate about 
whether certain lab results should be included in the revisions of the benefit/cost 
guidelines,
5 an official from the White House bluntly told me: “even though these 
results appear prevalent, they are suspiciously drawn … by methods similar to 
scientific numerology … because of student samples.”  I trust that 
experimentalists far and wide have received such criticism in more than one 
instance.  Indeed, this has seemingly been the main line of attack over the past 
half-century concerning the value of results from traditional laboratory 
experimentation.   
Moving closer to how naturally-occurring data are generated (see Figure 
2), Harrison and List (2004) denote a “framed field experiment” (FFE) as the 
same as an artefactual field experiment but with field context in the commodity, 
task, stakes, or information set of the subjects.  This type of experiment is 
                                                 
5 The more than 100 federal agencies issue approximately 4,500 new rulemaking notices each 
year.  About 25 percent of those 4,500 are significant enough to warrant Office of Management 
and Budget (OMB) review.  Of those, about 50-100 per year meet the necessary condition of being 
“economically significant” (more than $100 million in either yearly benefits or costs).  Every 
economically significant proposal receives a formal analysis of the benefits and costs by the 
agency.  The OMB establishes guidelines for the agencies on how to perform benefit-cost 
analysis.  Every so often the OMB revisits these guidelines.  Fortunately, during the time I was a 
Senior Economist at the Council of Economic Advisers (2002-2003), the OMB and the Council of 
Economic Advisers jointly revised these guidelines. 
  
important in the sense that a myriad of factors might influence behavior, and by 
progressing slowly toward the environment of ultimate interest one can learn 
about whether, and to what extent, such factors influence behavior in a case by 
case basis.   
Finally, a “natural field experiment” (NFE) is the same as a framed field 
experiment but where the environment is one where the subjects naturally 
undertake these tasks and where the subjects do not know that they are 
participants in an experiment.  Such an exercise represents an approach that 
combines the most attractive elements of the lab and naturally-occurring data:  
randomization and realism.  In this sense, comparing behavior across natural and 
framed field experiments (those framed field experiments at the Easternmost edge 
of that category) permits crisp insights into whether the laboratory environment in 
and of itself unduly influences behavior.   
Any simple field experimental taxonomy leaves gaps, and certain field 
experiments might not fall neatly into such a classification scheme, but such an 
organization provides some hints into what is necessary in terms of scientific 
discovery to link controlled experimentation in the lab to naturally-occurring data.  
This relationship is highlighted in Figure 2, which illustrates one of the virtues of 
field experiments:  they provide an empirical bridge between lab and naturally-
occurring data.  Experimentalists and non-experimentalists alike cannot 
reasonably begin to discuss issues of the day concerning generalizability of results 
from one domain to another before completely filling the knowledge gaps in the 
bridge contained in Figure 2 both theoretically and empirically.  This process has 
recently started, and we have begun to learn not only about the viability of our 
theories in the environments in which they purport to explain, but also about the 
robustness of laboratory results.   
Next, I highlight some of this work in a brief summary of merely a 
fraction of what we have learned thus far from field experiments.  Concurrently, I 
describe how the various studies in this special issue add to our knowledge base.   
 
2. Some Uses of Field Experiments
6 
 
The various areas to which field experiments contribute have clear overlaps, as 
many speak to both theorists and policymakers.  The following discussion 
presents a brief overview of some recent studies, and it highlights the areas 
addressed by the articles in this special issue on field experiments.  I begin with a 
summary of how field experiments can speak to theorists and policymakers.  I 
then turn to general methodological contributions of field experiments.  My 
examples are not exhaustive, nor even attempt to showcase the various areas to 
                                                 
6 The following structure shares many similarities to Roth (1995), who has provided an excellent 
overview of the virtues of laboratory experimentation.    
which field experiments have contributed.  Rather, this section’s goal is to 
summarize how the studies in this volume advance our understanding, and how 
they fit within broader areas of economics. 
 
2.1  Speaking to Theorists and Policymakers 
 
Field experiments can serve to facilitate a dialog between theorists and 
experimentalists.  Al Roth highlighted this virtue of lab experiments two decades 
ago at the symposium on experimental economics at the 5
th World Congress of 
the Econometric Society when he correctly noted that one of the important 
contributions of experimentalists is to “speak to theorists” (see Roth, 1987).   
Samuelson (2005) provides an excellent overview of the relationship between 
economic theory and experiments and how they work together to advance 
scientific knowledge (as do Roth, 1988, and Crawford, 1997).   
  Furthermore, field experiments coupled with proper theoretical 
underpinnings provide policymakers with useful information.  Indeed, one can 
envision the use of small scale field experiments in a similar manner as a 
federalist system uses its component parts.  Recall that much of what is 
introduced as “new” legislation at the top level of federalist systems is oftentimes 
experimented with at lower levels and found to be successful.  A famous example 
is the manner in which Franklin Roosevelt explained the origin of the ideas of his 
own New Deal:  “Practically all the things we've done in the federal government 
are the things Al Smith did as governor of New York.”
7 
 
2.1.1.  Markets 
 
Conventional economic theory relies on two assumptions:  utility-maximizing 
behavior and the institution of Walrasian tâtonnement.  Explorations to relax 
institutional constraints have taken a variety of paths, with traditional economic 
tools having limited empirical success partly due to the multiple simultaneously 
moving parts in the marketplace.  Perhaps this obstacle was the genesis behind 
Chamberlin (1948), who used Harvard students participating in decentralized one-
shot bargaining markets in what I believe to be the first market laboratory 
experiment in economics.  Chamberlin (1948) observed that volume was typically 
higher and prices typically lower than predicted by competitive models of 
equilibrium.  Efficiency was also frustrated in these bilateral negotiating markets.   
Smith (1962), a Harvard student at the time and experimental participant 
in Chamberlin’s markets, later refined Chamberlin’s work by varying two key 
aspects of the experimental design:  i) centrally occurring open outcry of bids and 
                                                 
7 It is therefore somewhat ironic how their relationship evolved throughout the two Presidential 
elections of the 1930s.    
offers, similar to stock and commodity exchanges (commonly termed “double-
auctions”), and ii) multiple market periods, allowing agents to learn.  Empirical 
results from Smith’s double-auctions were staggering—quantity and price levels 
were very near competitive levels—and served to present the first evidence that 
Walrasian tâtonnement, conducted by a central auctioneer, was not necessary for 
market outcomes to approach neoclassical expectations.  It is fair to say that this 
general result remains one of the most robust findings in experimental economics 
today.   
Hong and Plott (1982) is an example that makes a first step to explore 
behavior of non-student subjects in such laboratory markets.  They executed 
artefactual field experiments by including engineers from a Jet Propulsion 
Laboratory, CalTech faculty members, secretaries, and housewives.  They 
compared bilateral telephone negotiations with posted offer trading, across the 
same 33 subjects (22 sellers and 11 buyers) across four sessions, and they found 
that posted prices caused higher prices, lower volumes, and efficiency losses.   
Under bilateral negotiations, they reported a greater tendency for outcomes to 
converge to the competitive predictions.   
List (2004a) represents a framed field experiment that moves the analysis 
from the laboratory environment to the natural setting where the actors actually 
undertake decisions.  The study therefore represents an empirical test in an actual 
marketplace where agents engage in face-to-face continuous bilateral bargaining 
in a multi-lateral market context.  Much like Smith’s (1962) set-up, the market 
mechanics in these bilateral bargaining markets are not Walrasian.  Unlike Smith 
(1962), however, in these markets subjects set prices as they please, with no 
guidance from a centralized auctioneer.  Thus, this design shifts the task of 
adaptation from the auctioneer to the agents, permitting trades to occur in a 
decentralized manner, similar to how trades are consummated in actual free 
unobstructed markets.  In doing so, the market structure reformulates the problem 
of stability of equilibria as a question about the behavior of actual people as a 
psychological question—as opposed to a question about an abstract and 
impersonal market.  A key result of this study is the remarkably strong tendency 
for exchange prices to approach the neoclassical competitive model predictions, 
especially in symmetric markets.   
  A related market institution that has received increasing attention in 
economics is one-sided auctions.  For example, the framed field experiment of 
List and Lucking-Reiley (2000) compares bidding behavior across two multi-unit 
auction formats: the multi-unit Vickrey format and the uniform-price format.  In 
light of the fact that multi-unit auctions are used in several areas of the economy 
to allocate goods as services—e.g., the U.S. Treasury for debt sales—this research 
speaks to theorists as well as policymakers.  Auctioning off nearly $10,000 worth 
of goods in two-unit, two-person sealed-bid auctions, the authors report strong  
evidence of demand reduction.  In addition, they find that in contrast with 
theoretical predictions, the individual’s first-unit bids are significantly higher in 
the uniform-price than in the Vickrey treatment.   
The first result is similar to lab results reported in Kagel and Levin (2001), 
who perform a laboratory experiment to explore demand reduction by comparing 
the uniform-price sealed-bid format with an ascending-bid version of the Vickrey 
auction.  The anomalous first bid result has also been replicated in a controlled 
laboratory environment.  In particular, the anomalous result has been found to be 
prominent in two-bidder laboratory experiments as well (see, e.g., Engelmann and 
Grimm, 2003, and Porter, 2003), so it does not appear to be a consequence 
specific to their field environment.   
Hossain and Morgan (2006), in this volume, present a related, quite 
provocative natural field experiment whereby they use a 2x2 experimental design 
by selling matched pairs of CDs and Xbox games in an EBay field experiment.  
They compare a high shipping cost treatment versus a low shipping cost treatment 
crossed with a high total minimum bid versus low total minimum bid.  By 
manipulating the second treatment variable, the authors verify several basic 
predictions of auction theory:  increasing the total minimum bid does, as 
predicted, decrease the number of bidders and the probability of sale, but it 
increases the expected revenue conditional on sale.  
Therefore, increasing the shipping costs while decreasing the minimum 
bid tends to increase the overall revenues (including shipping) obtained by the 
seller.  This result holds true for both Xbox games and audio CDs, provided the 
total minimum bid is less than 30% of the retail price of the object.  This effect 
disappears, however, when the total minimum bid is more than half the retail 
price, achieved in this experiment when an $8 total minimum bid was applied to 
CDs.   Though surprising from the point of view of rational bidding theory, the 
authors point out that this result can be explained with a simple model that 
involves bidders tending to ignore the size of shipping costs in an auction unless 
said shipping costs become unusually large.  I view these results as having 
importance in both a positive and normative sense. 
Related to this fine piece of research are the innovative framed field 
experiments of Lucking-Reiley (1999) and Katkar and Reiley (2006).  The first 
study, which represents an early example of how the internet can be used to test 
economic theory, uses Internet-based auctions in a preexisting market with an 
unknown number of participating bidders.  The paper tests the theory of revenue 
equivalence between the four different single-unit auction formats.   
The latter piece, published in this volume, tests the theory of reserve 
prices.  More specifically, it designs a field experiment to compare outcomes in 
auctions with secret versus public reserve prices.  The authors’ auctioned 50 
matched pairs of Pokeman trading cards on eBay.  To gain identification, each  
card was auctioned twice, once with a minimum bid of 30% of the card’s book 
value and once with a minimum bid of $0.05 and a secret reserve price equal to 
30% of the card’s book value.  The use of a secret reserve price resulted in lower 
earnings for the sellers than did making the reserve price known.  Keeping the 
reserve price secret was found to reduce the probability of selling any card, the 
number of serious bidders in an auction, and the winning bid.  Thus, contrary to 
the beliefs of many eBay sellers and to the predictions of models of rational 
bidder behavior, using secret reserve prices instead of public reserve prices 
actually lowers a seller’s expected returns, by lowering both the probability that 
the auction will result in a sale, and the price received if it does result in a sale.   
I have not begun to scratch the surface of this area of study, as many other 
excellent studies in the economics literature use artefactual, framed, and natural 
field experiments to examine issues within the area of markets, or more narrowly, 
auctions.  I invite the interested reader to consult my field experimental website: 
http://www.arec.umd.edu/ fieldexperiments/ for a summary of many such studies.    
  
2.1.2  The Economics of Charity 
 
Charitable fundraising remains an important matter for the international 
community and more narrowly in the U.S., where the American Association of 
Fundraising Counsel estimates that total contributions to American philanthropic 
organizations in the year 2000 exceeded 2 percent of GDP.  Recent figures 
published by Giving USA show that in the U.S. charitable gifts of money have 
been 2% or more of GDP since 1998, and more than 89% of Americans donate to 
charity (Sullivan, 2002).  Experts predict that the combination of increased wealth 
and an ageing population will lead to even higher levels of gifts in the coming 
years (see, e.g., The Economist, July 29, 2004).  Interestingly, even though the 
stakes are clearly high, until the past several years even the most primitive facts 
concerning alternative fundraising mechanisms are largely unknown.   
Recently, a set of field experiments have lent insights into the “demand 
side” of charitable fundraising (where demand side means from the view of the 
charity).  One natural field experiment on the demand side is summarized in List 
and Lucking-Reiley (2002), who took advantage of a unique opportunity that was 
presented to start a research center (Center for Environmental Policy Analysis 
(CEPA)) at the University of Central Florida (UCF).  In an effort to multiply the 
seed funds that they were granted, they split the full capital campaign into several 
smaller capital campaigns, each of which served as a separate experimental 
treatment.  They solicited contributions from 3000 Central Floridian residents 
(some ‘warm’ list recipients, some ‘cold’ list recipients (those who have and have 
not given to UCF previously), randomly assigned to six different groups of 500, 
with each group asked to fund a separate computer for use at CEPA.  They found  
that increased seed money sharply increases both the participation rate of donors 
and the average gift size received from participating donors.  In addition, they 
found that refunds have a small, positive effect on the gift size, but no effect on 
the participation rate.   
Their data speak to theorists in that their main results are broadly 
consistent with the theoretical prediction of Andreoni (1998) that seed money 
may increase the amount of public-good provision in a charitable fundraiser, from 
zero to some positive equilibrium level G* (greater than or equal to the threshold 
level).  Additionally, concerning refunds, List and Lucking-Reiley find results 
consistent with Bagnoli and Lipman (1989), in that refunds do indeed increase 
charitable contributions.  These field results are consistent with laboratory results 
due to Bagnoli and McKee (1991), Rapoport and Eshed-Levy (1989) and Isaac et 
al  (1989).  List and Lucking-Reiley (2002), however, find that the effect of 
refunds is considerably smaller than that of seed money. 
Subsequent studies have provided similar insights.  For example, Falk 
(2006) uses a natural field experiment to explore whether small gifts increase 
giving and he finds that such gifts work:  compared to the baseline no gift case, a 
small gift increased both the average gift and the propensity to give.  Likewise, 
Rondeau and List (2005) make use of a natural field experiment, dividing 3000 
direct mail solicitations to Sierra Club supporters into four treatments and asking 
solicitees to support the expansion of a K-12 environmental education program.  
They find that announcement of seed money increases the participation rate of 
potential donors by 23% and total dollar contributions by 18%, compared to an 
identical campaign in which no announcement of leadership gift is made.  Finally, 
Frey and Meier (2004) provide empirical evidence from a clever natural field 
experiment that suggests individual comparisons are important when making the 
donation decision.   
Karlan and List (2006) extend this line of inquiry by soliciting 
contributions from more than 50,000 supporters of a liberal organization,  They 
randomize the subjects into several different groups to explore whether upfront 
monies used as matching funds promotes giving.  They find that simply 
announcing that a match is available considerably increases the revenue per 
solicitation—by 19%.  In addition, the match offer significantly increases the 
probability that an individual donates—by 22%.  Yet, while the match treatments 
relative to a control group increase the probability of donating, larger match 
ratios—$3:$1 (i.e., $3 match for every $1 donated) and $2:$1—relative to smaller 
match ratios ($1:$1) have no additional impact.   
  Relatedly, Chen et al (2006), published in this volume, represents the 
first in the economics literature to use a natural field experiment in the area of 
charitable giving on the internet.  The paper implements four donation solicitation 
mechanisms in a field experiment on the Internet and tests whether they matter for  
donation behavior.  While the results are not strong, they find that the seed and 
matching mechanisms each generate a significantly higher user click-through 
response rate than the baseline mechanism.  I view this study as pioneering an 
avenue for future research that should lead to several important discoveries.   
  Also in this special issue, Meier (2006) uses a natural field experiment 
to explore how framing influences giving.  The set-up has subjects in Zurich 
invited to contribute to a public good, and the experiment presents the same 
information differently:  a positive versus a negative framing of similar events.  
Empirical results suggest that the influence of framing is limited:  people increase 
their contribution to public goods when faced with many others who contribute, 
regardless of whether the information is framed on contributors or non-
contributors.  This represents an important result for fundraisers and academics 
alike.  Methodologically, it suggests that framing effects might not be as 
important in the field as in comparable lab environments.  This study is unique in 
that it takes the framing task in parallel environments and shows an interesting 
contrast in effects.  Scholars interested in generalizability of results across 
domains should find this paper of great interest.   
  More generally, the economics literature has witnessed a nice surge of 
natural field experiments exploring charitable fundraising using mail and phone 
solicitations. Field experiments that explore other aspects of the economics of 
charity have also witnessed a nice surge, and include, but are not limited to, 
Shang and Croson (2005), Eckel and Grossman (2005), and Landry et al (2006).  
Although not a study of matching, Shang and Croson (2005) is of particular 
interest because they examine the extensive margin by working with phone banks 
that receive inbound calls from public radio campaigns.  Thus, they have a sample 
of individuals who have already decided to give during the current round of 
soliciting, and they then examine which treatments alter the amount the individual 
chooses to give.  Their results are quite intriguing in that they report that reference 
points from “recent donors” matter greatly, particularly when the recent donor is 
of the same gender as the caller.   
Given their applicability to this area, I suspect that field experiments will 
continue to provide insights into the demand side of charitable fundraising, which 
remains long on anecdotes and short on hard empirical facts.   
 
2.1.3  Environmental Economics 
 
Policymaking is multi-dimensional; across many areas of economics, important 
rulemakings are proposed weekly.  The area of environmental/resource 
decisionmaking represents a particularly interesting area.  Ever since President 
Reagan’s 1981 Executive Order 12291, federal agencies are required to consider 
both the benefits and costs of regulations that are deemed “economically  
significant” prior to their implementation.  Several distinct methodologies are 
currently quite popular in the estimation of the total benefits associated with 
nonmarket goods and services, but the main workhorse is contingent valuation, 
which is arguably the most contentious.  While the approach allows the researcher 
to measure the total value of the commodity in question, recurrent concerns 
include hypothetical bias, starting point bias, information bias, strategic bias, and 
the embedding effect. 
Hypothetical bias is the difference between hypothetical and actual 
statements of value (see, e.g., Harrison, 2006 or Harrison and Rutstrom, 2006).  In 
the burgeoning validation study literature, scholars have attempted to discern the 
degree of hypothetical bias by comparing hypothetical and actual demonstrations 
of value in experimental markets, where the actual value is assumed to represent 
true preferences. 
This line of research appears to have commenced with Bohm’s (1972) 
seminal artefactual field experiment, which compared bids in hypothetical and 
actual markets that had subjects’ state their value to sneak preview a Swedish 
television show.  Given that reported calibration factors (ratio of hypothetical to 
actual values) tend to exceed 1, Bohm’s (1972) results suggest that people 
moderately overstate their actual values when asked a hypothetical question.   
Subsequent lab research has generally supported Bohm’s findings (for a meta-
analysis, see List and Gallet, 2001). 
More recent tests have explored alternative mechanisms as well as ex ante 
and ex post calibration schemes, with varied success (see, e.g., Cummings et al, 
1995; Cummings et al, 1997; Cummings and Taylor, 1999; List, 2001).  While 
most institutions have generally not performed well, in that hypothetical and 
actual behavior has not perfectly matched, in this special issue List et al (2006) 
explore a new approach to provide a firm understanding of the external validity 
properties of choice experiments.  A choice experiment (CE) asks subjects to 
choose between scenarios that are described by attributes of the good and 
therefore conveniently combines Lancaster’s (1966) characteristics theory of 
value with random utility theory (McFadden, 1974).  Using a framed field 
experiment, List et al (2006) find that hypothetical bias occurs at the level of the 
decision to purchase rather than at the intra-buy decision (i.e., conditional on 
purchasing, the marginal value vector might be biased).  They also find that 
choice experiments combined with “cheap talk” can yield credible estimates.
8   
Making use of a pioneering approach, Norwood and Lusk (2006), in this 
volume, advance this literature in a new direction by studying the use of a 
                                                 
8 The use of the term “cheap talk” in this study differs from the use of the term in the game theory 
literature.  In this study “cheap talk” refers to an ex ante method of attenuating hypothetical bias 
where the subject of hypothetical bias is made an integral part of the CVM questionnaire. This 
usage of the term “cheap talk” is consistent with Cummings et al (1995).    
donation mechanism to elicit the willingness-to-pay for a public good in presence 
of warm-glow from giving.  The authors' goal is to outline a method that can 
enhance the credibility of donations as a lower bound for estimating 
compensating surplus.  Importantly, they show that conceptually the multi-
donation mechanism can provide a credible lower bound for the willingness-to-
pay for a public good.  They illustrate the difference between single and multi-
donation mechanism by use of a framed field experiment where subjects could 
choose to get a gift (coupon) or to donate to a charity instead.   
The underlying message of the piece is that by offering multiple choices, 
the donation will be smaller, and, hence, the received amount represents a more 
credible lower bound to the individual’s willingness-to-pay.  This result follows 
from the fact that by manipulating the transaction costs of donating to different 
public goods, the warm-glow effect for donations to a specific cause is reduced.  
Therefore, the paper makes a methodological contribution, as the discussed 
problems and the outlined mechanism should be considered by any study using a 
donation mechanism to elicit willingness-to-pay.  In addition, they address a 
policy concern of first order importance.   
 
2.1.4  Development Economics 
 
Recent field experiments in development economics have come about from two 
quite distinct paths.  One approach has been similar to the methods discussed 
above:  take the laboratory tools to the field and examine behavior in a controlled 
setting.  One example of this kind is the artefactual field experiments reported in 
Henrich et al (2001, 2004).
9  In the latter study, the group of scholars conduct 
ultimatum, dictator, and public goods games in fifteen different small-scale 
communities in developing countries.  Critically, in all of the experiments 
Heinrich et al (2004) execute, the context that the experimenter can control—the 
payoffs, the description of the way the game is played, etc.—is almost identical.   
The authors report enormous variation in behavior across communities, 
differences they are able to relate to interactional patterns of everyday life and the 
social norms operating in these various communities.  For instance, as Henrich et 
al (2004, p. 31) note, the Orma community readily recognize “that the public 
goods game was similar to the harambee, a locally-initiated contribution that 
Orma households make when a community decides to construct a public good 
such as a road or school,” and they subsequently gave quite generously.   
Methodologically related to this line of work includes a series of studies 
using artefactual, framed, and natural field experiments, scholars in this literature 
have asked the important question—what are the determinants of default in a 
                                                 
9 Others have also been quite successful with this approach.  For example, see the excellent 
artefactual field experiments of Cardenas (2002, 2004) and Carpenter et al (2004).  
microfinance loan?—and attempt to link behavior in controlled and uncontrolled 
settings.  This agenda includes several recent papers, including, but not limited to 
Gine et al (2006), who use a framed field experiment with micro-entrepreneurs 
and employees of micro-entrepreneurs, and Gine and Karlan (2006), who use a 
natural field experiment to explore behavior of micro-entrepreneur females in the 
Philippines.   
While these types of studies litter the microfinance landscape, work is 
beginning that attempts to bridge the lab and the field.  Karlan (2005, 2006), for 
example, represent excellent examples of research that uses both lab and field 
experiments to explore behavior of female entrepreneurs in Ayacucho, Peru, in an 
attempt to predict default rates on loans.  Similar to the spirit of the field 
experiments described above, such attempts to combine insights gained from the 
lab and the field has been rare in the area of development economics.   
Related to this line of micro-credit research is novel work in the area of 
micro savings.  Ashraf et al (2006a), for instance, combine field experimental 
evidence with survey evidence to study take-up of a commitment savings product 
in the Philippines (Green Bank of Caraga, a rural bank in Mindanao).  The clever 
premise is that conditional on agents being sophisticated enough to realize that 
they have time-inconsistent preferences, with the correct information acquisition 
the authors should be able to observe that these same agents engage in various 
forms of commitment.  The authors find that women with hyperbolic preferences 
are sophisticated enough to engage in commitment but men with hyperbolic 
preferences are not.   
Closely linked to this work is the study published in this volume by Ashraf 
et al (2006b).  The authors use the same rural Philippine bank as Ashraf et al 
(2006a), and they use a natural field experiment to explore the impact of offering 
a deposit-collection service for micro-savers.  The service has a bank employee 
visiting the individual’s home once per month to pick up a savings deposit for a 
nominal fee.  Of the 141 individuals offered the service, 42 participated.   
Interestingly, those offered the service saved 188 pesos more (which equates to 
about a 25% increase in savings stock) than the baseline and were slightly less 
likely to borrow from the bank.  I view these types of results as fundamental in 
learning about how to deepen participation in formal financial institutions in a 
country like the Philippines. 
One will notice from these studies that as the researcher moves from the 
more controlled to the less controlled environment (i.e., proceeds Eastward in 
Figure 2), the approach closely follows the typical field experiment in 
development economics.  The typical field experiment in development economics 
arises not from taking the tight controls of the lab to the field, but from 
recognizing that the naturally-occurring data are limited.  This limitation often 
arises because the identification assumptions that are necessary to make strong  
inference are unduly restrictive.  The field experimentalists approaching the 
problem from this direction, therefore, adopt randomization to improve their 
identification.  In such studies, the typical approach is to use experimental 
treatments more bluntly than the controlled treatments discussed above, in that the 
designs often confound several factors.  Yet, the designs are often directly linked 
to an actual public policy, rendering a unique glimpse of important empirical 
evidence for policy purposes.  A few recent excellent examples in this field 
include the work of Banerjee et al (2004), Kremer et al (2004), Olken (2005), and 
Duflo et al (2006).  Again, the interested reader should see my field experimental 
website http://www.arec.umd.edu/ fieldexperiments/ for many more excellent 
examples in the development field.   
The astute reader will notice the similarities of this approach with the 
social experiments completed decades ago.  The first wave of such experiments 
included government agency’s attempts to evaluate programs by deliberate 
variations in agency policies.  Such large-scale social experiments included 
employment programs, electricity pricing, and housing allowances (see Hausman 
and Wise, 1985, for a review).  Another area of important work in this line of 
research includes social experiments that were new to the policy domain.
10  These 
included negative income tax experiments and the national health insurance 
experiments.  The interested reader should see the excellent article of Orcutt and 
Orcutt (1968), which provides an important early contribution on the virtues of 
social experiments.  
The second generation of major social experiments took place in the 
1980s, with the various welfare reform studies.  These experiments had an 
important influence on policy, as they were recognized as contributing to the 
Family Support Act of 1988, which overhauled the AFDC program (Manski and 
Garfinkel, 1992).  Indeed, as Manski and Garfinkel (1992) note, in Title II, 
Section 203, 102 Stat. 2380, the Act even made a specific recommendation on 
evaluation procedures:  “a demonstration project conducted … shall use 
experimental and control groups that are composed of a random sample of 
participants in the program.” 
This second wave of social experiments also had a methodological 
influence within academic circles, as it provided an arena for the 1980s debate 
between experimental advocates and those favoring structural econometrics using 
naturally-occurring data.  Manski and Garfinkel (1992) provide an excellent 
resource that includes insights on the merits of the arguments on both sides, and 
discusses the important methodological issues.  Many, if not all, of the criticisms 
of social experimentation advanced in this volume remain equally as valid for the 
typical field experiments in development economics.  
                                                 
10 I appreciate Charles Manski pointing me in this direction, and providing background about 
social experiments in an email exchange.  The contents of which influenced this section greatly.    
 
2.1.5  Discrimination 
 
One would be hard-pressed to find an issue as divisive for a nation as race and 
civil rights.  Yet our understanding of the sources of discrimination within the 
marketplace remains speculative.  The two major economic theories of 
discrimination are i) certain populations having a general “distaste” for minorities 
(Becker, 1957) or a general “social custom” of discrimination (Akerlof, 1980) and 
ii) statistical discrimination (see, e.g., Arrow 1972, Phelps 1972), which is third-
degree price discrimination as defined by Pigou:  marketers using observable 
characteristics to make statistical inference about productivity or reservation 
values of market agents.  An important lesson learned from the vast literature on 
discrimination is that data availability places severe constraints on efforts to 
understand the nature of discrimination, forcing researchers to speculate about the 
source of the observed discrimination. 
Although a very recent study thoroughly catalogues a variety of field 
experiments that test for discrimination in the marketplace (Riach and Rich, 
2002), a brief summary of the empirical results is worthwhile to provide a useful 
benchmark.  Labor market field studies present perhaps the broadest line of work 
in the area of discrimination.
11  The work in this area can be parsed into two 
distinct categories: personal approaches and written applications.   
Personal approaches include studies that have individuals either attend job 
interviews or apply for employment over the telephone.  In these studies, the 
researcher matches two testers who are identical along all relevant employment 
characteristics except the comparative static of interest (e.g., race, gender, age).  
Then, after appropriate training, the testers approach potential employers who 
have advertised a job opening.  Researchers “train” the subjects simultaneously to 
ensure that their behavior and approach to the job interview are similar.   
Under the written application approach, which can be traced to Jowell and 
Prescott-Clarke (1969), carefully prepared written job applications are sent to 
employers who have advertised vacancies.  The usual approach is to choose 
advertisements in daily newspapers within some geographic area to test for 
discrimination.  Akin to the personal approaches, great care is typically taken to 
ensure that the applications are similar across several dimensions except the 
variable of interest.  One recent creative study that uses the written approach is 
                                                 
11 A related “natural experiment” that lends important insights into labor market discrimination is 
due to Goldin and Rouse (2000).  They examine the effect of blind auditioning on the hiring 
practice of orchestras by measuring the treatment of females before and after the introduction of 
blind auditioning rules.  They find a considerable amount of gender discrimination:  in the 
preliminary and final rounds, a woman's chance of being hired is significantly increased when 
blind auditions are used.  
due to Bertrand and Mullainathan (2002), who manipulate perception of race by 
randomly assigning white-sounding or black-sounding names to resumes sent, to 
various prospective employers in Boston and Chicago.  They find that the simple 
name manipulation makes a large difference:  the “white” applicant garners an 
interview request for every eight resumes sent whereas the “black” applicant must 
send out fourteen resumes to gain one interview.  Adding positive background 
information to both resumes exacerbates, rather than attenuates, this difference.
12   
It is fair to say that this set of studies, including both personal and written 
approaches, has provided evidence that discrimination against minorities across 
gender, race, and age dimensions exists in the labor market.  But due to 
productivity unobservables, the nature or cause of discrimination is not 
discernible.  This point is made quite starkly in Heckman and Siegelman (1993, p. 
224), who note that “audit studies are crucially dependent on an unstated 
hypothesis: that the distributions of unobserved (by the testers) productivity 
characteristics of majority and minority worker are identical.”  They further note 
(p. 255): “From audit studies, one cannot distinguish variability in unobservables 
from discrimination.”  Accordingly, while these studies provide invaluable 
insights into documenting that discrimination exists, care should be taken in 
making inference about the type of discrimination observed.   
Much like the labor market studies, the literature examining discrimination 
in product markets has yielded important insights.  Again, rather than provide a 
broad summary of the received results, I point the reader to Yinger (1998) and 
Riach and Rich (2002), who provide nice reviews of the product market studies.
13  
While this set of studies spans housing markets, car markets, and car and home 
insurance markets, the bulk of work has taken place in the housing arena.  The 
character of the housing studies is very similar to the labor market studies 
described above:  matched pairs are formed, trained, and subsequently make 
inquiries to a real estate agent or prospective landlord.  As Yinger (1995) notes, 
discrimination in these markets is slightly different than that in labor markets:  in 
the housing market studies, the researcher measures “opportunity denying” or 
“opportunity diminishing” behavior in the marketplace.  For example, the real 
estate agent may steer the client to certain neighborhoods, or the landlord may 
quote less favorable rental arrangements to minorities (see Yinger, 1998, p. 23, 
for interesting anecdotes).   
                                                 
12 Related studies find that discrimination is not as straightforward as first believed, including 
Neumark et al (1996), who find that women face discrimination when seeking employment in 
high-priced, but not in medium- or low- priced restaurants, and Riach and Rich (1991), who 
observe female discrimination in computer analyst programming jobs, but not in computer 
programming jobs.   
13 The interested reader should also see the recent special Symposium issue on Discrimination in 
Product, Credit, and Labor Markets that appeared in the Journal of Economic Perspectives 
(Spring, 1998).  
Similar to the labor market studies, researchers typically detect a large 
degree of discrimination in the housing market.  For example, Yinger (1986) 
examines data drawn from a large audit study conducted in Boston in 1981 and 
reports that race played an important role:  black housing seekers were informed 
about 30 percent fewer available housing units than were whites.  In a related set 
of studies across England, France, and the U.S., empirical estimates suggest that a 
nontrivial level of discrimination exists in housing rental and sales (see Table 7 in 
Riach and Rich, 2002).  I should stress that these findings represent much more 
than academic curiosity:  in 1982 the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that fair housing 
audits are a legitimate enforcement tool (Yinger, 1998). 
Discriminatory behavior in product markets is not exclusive to housing 
markets, however, as it has been found in other product markets, including 
insurance markets (Daniel, 1968) and new car markets (Ayres and Siegelman, 
1995).  In Daniel (1968), minorities in various regions of Britain were either 
refused insurance outright, or were quoted a higher premium than their 
counterparts.  Similar practices were found in the U.S. home insurance market 
some twenty-seven years later (Yinger, 1998).  Moreover, Ayres and Siegelman 
(1995) present compelling evidence from more than 300 paired audits at new car 
dealerships in Chicago that dealers quoted significantly lower prices to white 
males than to black or female test buyers.  Consonant with the audit study 
literature, Ayres and Siegelman (1995) were careful to use identical bargaining 
scripts and to pair testers along several important criteria (e.g., age, education, 
attractiveness).
14   
Overall, the product market experimental studies paint a picture that is 
quite consonant with the empirical findings from the labor market studies.  Yet, 
much like the labor market studies that crucially depend on isomorphic 
distributions of productivity unobservables across majority and minority workers, 
the product studies critically rely on homogenous price reservation vectors across 
majority and minority agents, for example.  As Ayres and Siegelman (1995, p. 
317) note, “In car negotiations, dealers might use a customer’s race or gender to 
make inferences about a buyer’s knowledge, search and bargaining costs, or, more 
generally, her reservation price at the specific dealership.”  This quote highlights 
that without a proper understanding of the underpinnings of demand behavior, 
most importantly the distribution of reservation values of the various groups 
                                                 
14 The interested reader should also see Goldberg (1996), who uses a regression-based approach to 
model discrimination in the new car market and finds on average no discrimination across race or 
gender.  Goldberg reconciles the disparate results by noting that the controlled experiment in 
Ayres and Siegelman (1995) may eliminate the effects of actual differences in the reservation 
price distributions between the groups by restricting bargaining strategies to be similar across the 
various groups. 
 
    
under consideration, it is impossible to parse the nature of discrimination in 
markets.  While the literature has certainly attempted to shed light on these issues, 
data availability has placed severe constraints on these efforts.   
In this special issue, Riach and Rich (2006) extend this line of research by 
using a natural framed experiment.  In particular, they carefully match written 
applications made to advertised job vacancies in England to test for sexual 
discrimination in hiring.  They find statistically significant discrimination against 
men in the “female occupation” and against women in the “male occupation.”   
This is important evidence to begin to uncover the underlying causes for 
discrimination in the labor market.  This study is also careful to point out that it is 
difficult to parse the underlying motivation for why such discrimination exists.  
Even without such evidence, however, the paper is powerful in that it provides a 
glimpse of an important phenomenon in a significant market, and provocatively 
leads to questions that need to be addressed before strong policy advice can be 
given. 
Yet, a series of field experiments represents a useful approach to parse the 
two forms of discrimination described earlier.  This is precisely what is offered in 
List (2004b), who uses a series of field experiments—from aretfactual to framed 
to natural—in an actual marketplace to provide an empirical framework to 
disentangle the underlying forces behind differential market treatment.  Using 
data gathered from more than 1100 market participants, he finds a strong 
tendency for minorities to receive initial and final offers that are inferior to those 
received by majorities, and that the observed discrimination is not due to animus, 
but represents statistical discrimination.  Furthermore, these results hold when 
nondealers are acting as buyers and as sellers, though the degree of discrimination 
is greater when agents are selling their wares, providing initial evidence that 
“consumer-side” discrimination is more pronounced than “seller-side” 
discrimination.  This study highlights that a series of field experiments can be 
used to uncover the causes and underlying conditions necessary to produce data 
patterns observed in the lab or in uncontrolled field data. 
 
2.2  Appropriate Inference 
 
Besides uncovering the causes and underlying conditions necessary to observe 
certain data patterns, field experiments can also be used to highlight that certain 
results from lab experiments or naturally-occurring data should be defined more 
narrowly than first believed, or even might cause the initial insights from the lab 
or the field to be reinterpreted. 
A first example of this type of contribution can be found when considering 
the case of reference dependent preferences.  In an influential experimental study, 
Kahneman et al (1990) use a discrete-choice auction to buy and sell commodities  
with close substitutes (pens and coffee mugs) provides compelling evidence to 
reject the equality hypothesis of willingness to accept (WTA) and willingness to 
pay (WTP).  These experimental findings have been robust across unfamiliar 
goods, such as irradiated sandwiches, and common goods, such as chocolate bars, 
with most authors noting that the deviation between WTA and WTP is much 
larger than economic intuition would suggest.  This result has important 
normative implications, but in a positive sense the disparity also holds power, as 
some have argued that it essentially renders the invariance result of Coase invalid 
(see, e.g., Kahneman et al, 1990).   
Empirical results in List (2003, 2004c) highlight that the scope of 
inference can be sufficiently crystallized with field experiments.  The data are 
consistent with the premise that individual behavior converges to the neoclassical 
prediction as market experience intensifies.  This result not only provides support 
for the received lab results in regards to inexperienced agents behaving 
consistently with reference-dependent theory, but also narrows the scope, as the 
seasoned players show no signs of such preference structures.  If one interprets 
such findings as suggesting that individuals have “true” preferences that do not 
exhibit loss aversion, and market experience allows those true preferences to be 
“discovered,” then these results have important implications for economic models 
and welfare economics more narrowly.  Tentatively, this is how I have interpreted 
these findings.
15  Note that this interpretation is consistent with the empirical 
results reported in recent lottery auction results of Loomes et al (2003).
16   
A second example of this type of contribution can be found when 
considering the literature on social preferences.  One of the most influential areas 
of research in experimental economics in recent years has been on games that are 
argued to provide insights into social preferences.  This class of experimental 
games include trust, or gift exchange, games (e.g., Camerer and Weigelt, 1988; 
Fehr et al, 1993).  Findings from such games have been interpreted as providing 
strong evidence that many agents behave in a reciprocal manner even when the 
behavior is costly and yields neither present nor future material rewards.  Further, 
the results have been widely applied outside the laboratory, based on the 
assumption that the experimental findings are equally descriptive of the world at 
large.   
To explore the importance of social preferences in the field, List (2006) 
carries out gift exchange natural field experiments in which buyers make price 
offers to sellers, and in return sellers select the quality level of the good provided 
                                                 
15 See Plott (1996) for a good discussion of the discovered preference hypothesis. 
16 I should stress “consistent with” since Loomes et al (2003, p. C165) state that “our results 
suggest that market experience does tend to erode whatever casual factors generate the tendency 
for WTA to be systematically greater than WTP.”  But, they later discuss why they cannot 
pinpoint whether the mechanism at work is “refining” or “market discipline.”  
to the buyer.  Higher quality goods are costlier for sellers to produce than lower 
quality goods, but are more highly valued by buyers.  The artefactual field 
experimental results mirror the typical findings with other subject pools: strong 
evidence for social preferences was observed through a positive price and quality 
relationship.  Similar constructed framed field experiments provide similar 
insights.  Yet, when the environment is moved to the marketplace via a natural 
field experiment, where dealers are unaware that their behavior is being recorded 
as part of an experiment, little statistical relationship between price and quality 
emerges. 
Other field generated data yield similar conclusions.  For example, Benz 
and Meier (2006) combine insights gained from a controlled laboratory 
experiment and a natural field experiment to compare how individuals behave in 
donation laboratory experiments and how the same individuals behave in the 
field.  Consistent with the insights found in List (2006), they find some evidence 
of correlation across situations, but find that subjects who have never contributed 
in the past to the charities gave 75 percent of their endowment to the charity in the 
lab experiment.  Similarly, those who never gave to the charities subsequent to the 
lab experiment gave more than 50 percent of their experimental endowment to the 
charities in the lab experiment.  Relatedly, making use of a natural field 
experiment, Bandiera et al (2005) find that behavior is consistent with a model of 
social preferences when workers can be monitored, but when workers cannot be 
monitored, pro-social behaviors disappear.  Being monitored proves to be the 
critical factor influencing behavior in this study.   
Closely related to Bandiera et al (2005) is a nice example of a natural field 
experiment published in this volume—Bandiera et al (2006).  Similar to Bandiera 
et al (2005), their natural field experiment was completed jointly with the 
management of a leading fruit farm in the United Kingdom.  Their subjects are 
farm workers, whose main task is to pick fruit. Workers were paid according to a 
relative incentive scheme that provides a rationale for cooperation, as the welfare 
of the group is maximized when workers fully internalize the negative externality 
that their effort places on others.  Provocatively, Bandiera et al (2006) find that 
individuals learn to cooperate over time, both from their experience and from the 
experience of others.  This result is similar to the endowment effect papers noted 
above, in that it suggests the power of individual level experience.   
Related to this piece is the excellent study in this volume due to Carpenter 
and Seki (2006).  This well designed artefactual field experiment explores the 
determinants of individual contributions in a standard public goods game.  The 
key innovation is that the players are drawn from work environments within the 
fishing industry of one particular Japanese community.  This approach yields a 
level of control for common cultural features of the players, but more importantly 
the individuals work in slightly different areas of the fishing community.  Each  
job type faces differing degrees of on-the-job competition. For example, one 
group of players are fishermen, a second group run the cooperative where all fish 
are auctioned, and a third group of players are fish traders that sell the fish to 
wholesalers.  Upon tackling the selection issue, Carpenter and Seki (2006) 
combine behavior in simple games with survey responses to find that individual 
contributions in the public goods games are higher for those individuals who face 
less on-the-job competition in their workplace.  In addition, individuals that 
perceive more competition in the workplace contribute significantly less to the 
public good, conditional on their job type.  This particular paper is important on 
several fronts, but perhaps the most important innovation is that it begins to 
provide an understanding of when and where we should expect social preferences 
to be integral and attempts “price” their importance.   
 
2.3  General Methodological Issues 
 
Success of the experimental model in the physical and biological sciences has led 
to the tendency in the behavioral sciences to follow precisely a paradigm 
originated for the study of inanimate objects, i.e., one that proceeds by exposing 
the subject to various conditions and observing the differences in reaction of the 
subject under different conditions.  The use of such a model with animal or 
human subjects, however, leads to the problem that subjects in the experiment are 
assumed, at least implicitly, to be passive responders to stimuli—an assumption 
difficult to justify in some cases.  Further, under this approach, the experimental 
stimuli themselves are usually rigorously defined in terms of what is done to the 
subject.   
The fact that context and relational situations heavily influences behavior 
presents a particularly vexing situation because the activity of ceteris paribus 
testing in and of itself might alter the phenomenon of interest.  Unlike natural 
phenomena such as bumble bees, bacterial genes, and water, which are 
identifiable as such inside and outside of the laboratory, the phenomena of interest 
for many economists might not retain their identities without their relation to field 
referents.  For this, and several other reasons, some scholars have debated about 
how readily results from the laboratory domain are applicable to certain field 
counterparts—most recently see Levitt and List (2005).
17   
An important issue pertaining to the proper inference of experimental 
results is whether the behavioral principles discovered in the lab are shared in the 
extra-lab world.  For physical laws and processes (e.g. gravity, photosynthesis, 
mitosis), the evidence to date supports the idea that what happens in the lab is 
                                                 
17  Many other discussions exist as well.  See, for example, Kagel et al, (1979), Cross (1980), 
Starmer (1999a, 1999b), Bohm (2002), and Hertwig and Ortmann (2001).  Of course, the issue of 
generalizability might not be important in some cases (see, e.g., Mook, 1983, and Schram, 2002).   
equally valid in the broader world.  Shapley (1964, p. 43), for instance, noted that 
“as far as we can tell, the same physical laws prevail everywhere.”  Likewise, 
Newton (1687, p. 398, 1966) scribed that “the qualities … which are found to 
belong to all bodies within the reach of our experiments, are to be esteemed the 
universal qualities of all bodies whatsoever.”
18   
In this regard, typical criticisms of the laboratory method in economics 
have focused on the representativeness of the population.  Such criticisms have 
drawn the ire of the pioneers of experimental economics.  For example, Smith 
(1980, p. 350) notes that: “Experiments are sometimes criticized for not being 
‘realistic’, i.e., parallelism is questioned ... are there field data to support the 
criticism, i.e., data suggesting that there may be differences between laboratory 
and field behavior.  If not, then the criticism is pure speculation.”  Smith was 
indeed correct, evidence was limited on behavior similarities across domains, and 
today scant evidence remains, yet it is important to recognize that as Figure 1 
makes clear, other factors besides the subject pool vary between the lab and field.  
Such factors including the commodity, stakes, environment, task, time-frame, etc., 
might induce behavioral differences across domains and importantly interact with 
treatment.   
To make matters concrete, consider the model of Levitt and List (2005), 
which represents a framework for thinking about generalizability.  In their model, 
a utility-maximizing individual i is faced with a choice regarding a single action 
() 1 , 0 ∈ a .  Focusing on the case in which utility is additively separable in the 
morality and wealth arguments, the Levitt and List (2005) utility function when 
an individual i takes action a is given by 
 
(1) ) , ( ) , , , ( ) , , , ( v a W s n v a M s n v a U i i i + =     
 
where  Mi and Wi represent morality and wealth arguments for individual i,  v 
represents stakes of the game, n represents social norms against an action, and s 
represents scrutiny, which includes lab effects and non-anonymity effects.
19   
                                                 
18 The importance of this metaphysical principle should not be underestimated.  Consider the 
recent revolution of understanding concerning the planet Pluto.  When James Christy and Robert 
Harrington discovered Pluto’s moon, Charon in 1978, planetary scientists hailed the discovery 
because they could now calculate Pluto’s mass accurately by using the orbiting period and the 
laws of gravitation.  Measurements subsequently informed planetary scientists that the Pluto-
Charon system is about 1/400
th the mass of earth, much smaller than the first estimate that Pluto 
was about 10 times as massive as the earth (Binzel, 1990).   
19 Several items are “left on the sidelines” in this simple model.  For example, scaling up “short-
run” behaviors from the lab to make inference on “long-run” behaviors in the field.  In most cases, 
laboratory experiments are designed to last no more than a few hours, yet, inference is oftentimes 
made over much longer time periods.  Also, subjects tend to have less experience with the games 
they play in the lab, the lab experience generally suppresses learning from peers, and experiments  
  What this simple framework makes clear is that several assumptions must 
be made to conclude strongly that behavior in the lab is a good indicator of 
behavior in the field.  I demonstrate this point with a simple graphical 
interpretation of this model.  For ease of exposition, assume that the action 
represents how much money to send to an anonymous stranger in another room 
(i.e., a dictator game).  Let me continue with the notation used in Section I, and 
assume that τi = yi1 - yi0 is the treatment effect for individual i, where in this case 
this effect represents what some have argued is the degree of social preferences of 
agent i.  Figure 3 shows a hypothetical density of τi in the population, a density 
assumed to have mean, τ*.   
 
Figure 3:  Simple Illustration of Heterogeneous Treatment Effects 
    f(τ) 
 τ 
  τ TU     τ
 +  τ*  τ TT 
 
In this case, the parameter τ* is equivalent to the average treatment effect; this is 
the treatment effect of interest if the analyst is pursuing an estimate of the average 
social preferences in this population. 
Of first concern is that selection into the lab experiment is not random, but 
might occur with a probability related to τ.  One example of such an argument can 
be found in the social psychology literature, where it has been asserted that 
                                                                                                                                     
typically have short durations.  Other arguments exist as well (see, e.g., Kagel et al, 1979, Cross, 
1980, Starmer, 1999a, 1999b, Bohm, 2002, and Hertwig and Ortmann, 2001).    
“scientific do-gooders,” interested in the research, or students who readily 
cooperate with the experimenter and seek social approval are those students who 
select into the lab (Orne, 1962).
20  Using this notion to formulate the selection rule 
leads to positive selection: subjects with higher τ values are more likely to 
participate if offered.  In Figure 3, I denote the cutoff value of τi as τ+:  students 
above τ+ participate, those below do not.   
In this example, the treatment effect on the treated is what is measured in 
the lab experiment: τTT.  τTT is equal to E(τi|τi > τ+), which represents the estimate 
of social preferences for those who participate.  A lack of recognition of selection 
causes the analyst to mis-measure the treatment effect for the population of 
interest.  Figure 3 also shows the treatment effect on the untreated, τTU.  This τTU is 
equal to E(τi|τi  <  τ+), which represents the unobserved estimate of social 
preferences for those who chose not to participate.  Therefore, the population 
parameter of interest, τ*,  is  a  mixture  of  these  two  effects:                                  
τ*= Pr*τTT + (1-Pr)*τTU, where Pr represents the probability of τi > τ+.  Even if one 
assumes that the population density of τi among students is isomorphic to the 
population density of inferential interest, such selection frustrates proper 
inference.   
A related concern is whether the density of τi in the student population 
exactly overlaps with the population of interest.  Under the framework of equation 
(1), this revolves around the question of whether population distributions have 
similar structures (that is, Mi ≠ M j for individuals i and j, for example).  One 
approach to investigating this question is to run experiments with professionals, or 
other representative agents (artefactual field experiments), and compare the 
results to students in similar laboratory experiments.  In order for these laboratory 
findings to be meaningful, however, it must be the case that the scope of lab and 
non-anonymity effects (e.g., the change in emphasis on the moral action) are 
similar across experimental samples.  One example in a game that trades-off 
morality and wealth is Fehr and List (2004), who examine experimentally how 
Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) in Costa Rica behave in trust games and 
                                                 
20 For example, when experimentally naïve high school students were asked “How do you think 
the typical human subject is expected to behave in a psychology experiment?” over 70 percent 
circled characteristics labeled cooperative and alert (Rosenthal and Rosnow, 1973, pp. 136-137).  I 
should highlight, however, that these discussions typically revolve around social psychology 
experiments.  Since economic experiments involve different subject matter and involve monetary 
payments, such arguments might not generalize across disciplines (see, e.g., Kagel et al, 1979).  
There is some evidence that volunteer subjects in an economics experiment have more interest in 
the subject than non-volunteers (Kagel et al, 1979), consistent with the social psychology 
literature.  Their study, however, also finds that other important variables are not different across 
volunteers and non-volunteers.  This is a clear example where much more research is needed in 
experimental economics. 
  
compare their behavior with that of Costa Rican students.  They find that CEOs 
are considerably more trusting and exhibit more trustworthiness than students.  
These differences in behavior may mean that CEOs are more trusting in everyday 
life, or it may be that CEOs are more sensitive to the lab and non-anonymity 
effects, or that the stakes are so low for the CEOs that the sacrifice to wealth of 
making the moral choice is infinitesimal. 
A neat example of an artefactual field experiment that explores this 
behavior in a much different setting is Cooper (2006) in this volume.   The paper 
extends the fruitful research program of Jordi Brandts and David Cooper in that it 
uses a class of coordination games (‘weakest link’ games) to investigate how 
managerial intervention acts to foster coordination of effort among a group of 
workers.  Games in this spirit have multiple Pareto-ranked Nash equilibria.   
Several key results arise: i) both improving incentives and the level of incentives 
have a positive effect on the minimum effort level; ii) a message that specifies a 
specific effort level, states the specific bonus level, and makes no reference to a 
plan is very effective in inducing a positive effect on the minimum effort level; 
and iii) experienced managers use effective messages types much more frequently 
than do inexperienced managers.  Yet, once the effect of selection of types of 
messages is controlled, experience alone does not have a strong effect on 
minimum effort level.  For our purposes, the key contribution of this paper is in 
its use of professional managers in the experimental environment.  Cooper 
identifies an important difference across subject pools—the rate at which the 
professional managers achieve high minimum effort levels is much greater than 
the student subjects.  One piece of inference is that the results support the notion 
that the effect of real world skills can be investigated in laboratory environments.  
The tenor of this result is consonant with the findings of Alevy et al (2006), who 
conduct an artefactual field experiment with professional futures and options 
traders along with a control group of students.  
Even if strong unequivocal insights could be gained about subject pool 
differences from these experiments, a related issue lurks in Figure 3:  only certain 
types of participants—students or professionals—are willing to take part in the 
experiment.  And, if the selection rule differs across subject pools, then valid 
inference might be frustrated.  This point can be made most vividly with an 
example.  Some experimental evidence suggests that women are more pro-social 
than men.  Other studies have shown that women experience increases in elation 
and activity near the time of ovulation, whereas premenstrual and menstrual 
periods increase tension, irritability, depression, anxiety, and fatigue (Moos et al, 
1969; Parlee, 1973; De Marchi and Tong, 1972).  Interestingly, Doty and 
Silverthorne (1975) find that most of the female volunteers for their experiment 
were in the ovulatory phase, whereas most of the female non-participants were in 
the postovulatory, premenstrual, and menstrual phases.  If similar selection effects  
occur in economics experiments, then one cannot be sure that the gender results in 
regards to social preferences are due to selection or natural gender differences.   
Beyond selection and subject pool effects, the framework in equation (1) 
also has predictions related to the experimental environment (i.e., norms and the 
nature and extent of scrutiny).  For example, scholars have scribed of a plethora of 
reasons why one might call into question the notion of “behavioral” parallelism:  
“experimenter demand effects,” “Hawthorne effects,” or simply that the task is 
undertaken in an artificial setting can each potentially admit biases in behavior.
21  
Such effects can cause the f(τ) distribution in Figure 3 to shift.   
The evidence discussed above on gift exchange provides insights into the 
power of such effects.  These results are at odds with the conventional wisdom of 
critics of experimental methods:  that representativeness of the sampled 
population is the most crucial variable in determining generalizability.  Rather, 
these results suggest that in some important games, representativeness of the 
environment, rather than representative of the sampled population, is the most 
crucial variable in determining generalizability of results.  In summary, one must 
be aware that the laboratory environment itself—from the presence of the 
experimenter to the tightly controlled settings—does not merely involve the 
introduction of additional alien factors; it potentially alters the participants’ 
conception of the situation.   
This reasoning extends beyond laboratory games that pit morality and 
wealth.  A simple example illustrating the goal of experimentation should suffice.  
Extending the simple treatment approach in Section 1, I assume that the analyst is 
interested in measuring the treatment effect, τ, in the following model:  Y = Xβ1 + 
τT + XTβ2 + η, where Y is the outcome, X is a vector of domain specific factors 
(consider these the various conditions in an experiment discussed above, such as 
the nature and extent of scrutiny, etc.), T is a treatment indicator.  This is a 
slightly different way of saying that τ is a function of the environment, as argued 
in the treatment framework above.  In this case, the “deep” structural parameters 
obtained from a preference measurement experiment like a dictator game include 
contributions from both the treatment and environmental factors, Xβ1 (and XTβ2 if 
there are interaction effects).   
This formulation also makes clear that the mere fact that the Xs are held 
constant in the laboratory does not ensure clean measures of τ in those cases 
where the analyst seeks an estimated treatment (comparative static) effect.  Thus, 
a standard experimental question such as “does a change in lighting lead to a 
productivity change?” might be compromised.  A first problem arises if there is an 
interaction effect between the treatment and the environment.  Hawthorne type 
                                                 
21 By now decades of research within psychology reports on the potentially serious biases 
associated with laboratory experimentation.  The interested reader should see the work on the 
experimenter-subject interaction of Orne (1959a, 1959b, 1962) and Rosenthal (1967, 1969).    
effects remind us that the act of observation might augment the effect of 
treatment, providing a treatment effect estimate of τ + Xβ2 rather than τ.  Even in 
the absence of such interaction effects, making inference about the treatment 
effect is difficult because in such cases the Xs might be held constant at the wrong 
levels (i.e., a five-unit treatment effect estimate might be interpreted much 
differently against a baseline of three (Xβ1 = 3) than against a baseline of three 
hundred (Xβ1 = 300)).  One is left with the conclusion that laboratory games are 
important in providing qualitative conclusions, such as signing the treatment 
effect, but interpretation beyond that remains hazardous unless one is willing to 
add further assumptions.  In certain situations it will make good sense to impose 
such further assumptions, as guided by theory, reinforcing the notion that 
economic theory is important for the interpretation of parameters obtained via 
experimentation.   
 
3.  Epilogue 
 
As Roth (1995) aptly notes, experimentalists typically take stock in making 
steady, incremental progress to speak to theorists and policymakers, and to find 
facts.
22  This follows from the belief that a series of experiments provides a more 
reliable conclusion.  I subscribe to this line of thought, as it seems clear that one 
should bring to bear as much empirical evidence as possible to the problem at 
hand.  This study argues that field experiments should play an important role in 
the discovery process.   
  Field experiments represent a unique manner in which to obtain data 
because they force the researcher to understand everyday phenomena, many of 
which we stumble upon frequently.  Merely grasping the interrelationships of 
factors in such settings is not enough, however, as the scholar must then seek to 
understand more distant phenomena that have the same underlying structure.   
Until then, one cannot reap the true rewards of field experimentation.  Such an 
approach requires a firm understanding of the economic and psychological 
similarities and dissimilarities between domains that theory predicts will have 
some import.   
  Some renowned scholars have voiced skepticism toward using controlled 
experimental methods in economics.  For example, Samuelson and Nordhaus 
(1983) took a pessimistic view of the abilities of the experimental methodology 
more than two decades ago:  
 
The economic world is extremely complicated.  There are millions of people and 
firms, thousands of prices and industries.  One possible way of figuring out 
                                                 
22 See Roth’s 1985 symposium on experimental economics at the 5
th World Congress of the 
Econometric Society where he discusses how experiments are motivated.  
economic laws in such a setting is by controlled experiments.  A controlled 
experiment takes place when everything else but the item under investigation is 
held constant.  Thus a scientist trying to determine whether saccharine causes 
cancer in rats will hold “other things equal” and only vary the amount of 
saccharine.  Same air, same light, same type of rat. 
  Economists have no such luxury when testing economic laws.  They 
cannot perform the controlled experiments of chemists or biologists because they 
cannot easily control other important factors.  Like astronomers or 
meteorologists, they generally must be content largely to observe. 
  If you are vitally interested in the effect of the 1982 gasoline tax on fuel 
consumption, you will be vexed by the fact that in the same year when the tax 
was imposed, the size of cars became smaller.  Nevertheless, you must try to 
isolate the effects of the tax by attempting to figure out what would happen, if 
“other things were equal.”  You can perform calculations that correct for the 
changing car size.  Unless you make such corrections, you cannot accurately 
understand the effects of gasoline taxes. 
 
As the current methodological summary illustrates, field experiments have the 
potential to provide “other things equal” tests in natural environments that 
economists’ theories purport to describe.  In this light, economists can go beyond 
activities of astronomers and meterologists and approach the testing of laws akin 
to chemists and biologists.  In this spirit, perhaps in some small way, field 
experiments can alleviate typical criticisms of results from laboratory experiments 
by showing that such results have broader applicability than first believed in 
certain instances.   
More broadly, the study highlights that given the nature of the economic 
science, there is much to be gained from designing experimental treatments that 
span the bridge between the lab and the naturally-occurring environment.  The 
laboratory provides the sterile environment where the restricted model from 
physics can be the ideal.  Alternatively, experimenting in a natural setting, where 
the looser model often employed in the biological sciences prevails, provides a 
useful parallel that strongly complements laboratory results.  Where the 
laboratory can provide crisp inference and solidify insights gained from field data, 
field experiments can prevent the laboratory from over-developing ideas and 
concepts that have little parallel in the field.  Likewise, if the relationships 
observed in the lab manifest themselves in the field, one can be re-assured that the 
lab has not advanced to the point of developing artificial situations that are too far 
removed from the field.  Two-way interactions across lab and field methodologies 
and between theory and practice permit a much deeper and broader understanding 
of economics.   
I have attempted in this introductory document to summarize how field 
experiments contribute to the economics literature.  Undoubtedly, the field is 
growing quickly, and if I wait another month I will be missing some important  
studies.  For this reason, I have not attempted to canvass the entire spectrum of 
field experimental work.  Rather, I have summarized the studies in the BE-JEAP 
special issue on Field Experiments and have attempted to weave them into the 
existing fabric of field experiments.  Field experiments take many shapes and 
forms, and all might not fit neatly into the guideposts herein.  Yet, I hope that 
these guideposts permit a more informative discussion of how field experiments 
can be used to yield a deeper understanding of economic science.  I trust that the 
papers in this special issue will play a role in this regard as well.    
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